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Abstract
We discuss in this paper a lower bound on communication cost for se-
cure group key management protocols. To model a rekeying process, we
introduce the concept of rekey encryption graphs. Using the rekey encryp-
tion graphs, we show that given the forward access control requirement, i.e.
a user who has left the secure group cannot have access to future group keys,
there exists a sequence of
2
n user join and leave requests such that the amor-
tized per request communication cost is
￿
(
l
n
(
n
)
). Given the known proto-
cols that have achieved this lower bound, in order to further improve the
scalability of group rekeying communication protocol performance, future
research needs to either allow more types of operations or to relax security
requirements to achieve better performance.
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CDA-9624082.
yContact author, Phone: (512)471-9599,Fax: (512)471-8885
11 Introduction
Many emerging network applications (such as teleconference and information
dissemination services) are based upon a group communications model. As a
result, securing group communications becomes a critical networking research is-
sue. Recently, Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) has formed Secure Multicast
Research Group (SMuG)[6] to investigate the problem of securing group commu-
nications. One major problem area in securing group communication is the group
key management problem, which is concerned with the secure distribution and
refreshment of user keying material.
The objective of a key management system is to add access control on top of
efﬁcient multicast communication such as over IP multicast [5]. A standard tech-
nique to this end is to maintain a common group key that is known to all multicast
group members, but is unknown to non-group members. All group communica-
tion will be encrypted using this shared key. The main problem for this approach
is that in a dynamic membership environment, users will join and leave the group,
therefore, efﬁciently changing the group key becomes a performance issue.
It is clear that user join requests do not pose a issue because all users in the
group share a common group key before the new user joins, and therefore can
change to a new group key using the current group key. It is user leave requests
that pose the scalability issue. Since the leaving user shares the group key with
other users, in order to distribute a new group key to the remaining users, other
keys may have to be used. In the simplest case, the key server may have to send
the new group key encrypted by a remaining user’s individual key, which is only
shared between a user and the key server. If the number of users in the group is
n,
the complexity of this simple scheme has a complexity of
O
(
n
).
In thepast fewyears, severalschemeshavebeenproposedto improverekeying
performance, and these schemes can improve the rekeying complexity from
O
(
n
)
to
O
(
l
n
(
n
)
) [9, 8, 1]. Besides the group key and individual keys, these schemes
use auxiliary keys to improve rekeying performance. In particular, for two keys
k
and
k
0, they will use
k to encrypt
k
0 and then send the encryption to all users. Any
user who have
k will be able to decrypt
k
0.
Withtheseproposedschemes, oneremainingquestioniswhethertheseschemes
have achieved the best possible performance. In another words, can we do better?
In order to answer this question, a study of the rekeying protocol lower bound
will be helpful because it can not only show whether the proposed schemes have
achieved the lower bound, it can also point out which constraints play an impor-
tant role to derive the lower bound. In order to further improve performance,
2either more types of operations have to be considered or some constraints have to
be relaxed.
In the past few years, several lower bounds on broadcast encryption have been
derived [2, 7, 3]. However, these lower bounds are mostly concerned with the
the tradeoffs between communication cost and storage cost. The lower bound
closest to our result is derived in [3]. In [3], Canetti, Malkin and Nissim derived
lower bounds on the tradeoffs between communication and user storage costs for
group rekeying in a dynamic multicast group with one key server. In particular,
they have derived the following two results: (1) Let
M denote the set of users
in a session. Let
b
(
n
)
+
1 be the maximal number of keys held by any user
in
M, where
n is the number of receivers in the session. Denote the rekeying
communicationcost
c
(
n
) as the worst case number ofkeys to be encrypted when a
userleaves. Then therekeyingcommunicationcostsatisﬁes
c
(
n
)
￿
n
1
=
b
(
n
)
￿
1.( 2 )
Deﬁne a special class of rekeying protocols called structure preserving protocols.
Intuitively, structure preserving protocols are those that maintain the property of
“the set
U has advantage over the user
v” across updates, for any subset
U and
user
v. That is, if there is a set of users
U all sharing a key
k, and a user
v which
does not have this key, then after removing another user
v
0 (whether
v
0
2
U or
not), the users in
U still hold some key
k
0 that
v does not hold. For this special
class of rekeying protocol, the authors proved that the rekeying communication
cost satisﬁes
c
(
n
)
￿
b
n
1
=
b
￿
b, where
b
+
1denotes the maximal number of keys
held by any user in
M.
These two results are the ﬁrst to show the tradeoff between user storage cost
b
(
n
) and communication cost
c
(
n
) when a user leaves. From the communication
lower bound of
c
(
n
)
￿
b
n
1
=
b
￿
b, we may draw the conclusion that if we in-
crease the number of keys each user holds to be very large, we may reduce the
communication cost to be very low.
However, the bandwidth utilized by a rekeying protocol includes both user
join communication cost and user leave communicationcost, and the authors have
only considered the leave communication cost. Intuitively,the storage cost
b
(
n
) is
related to join cost because the higher the number of keys a user holds, the higher
the bandwidth to distribute these keys to the newly joined users. In the extreme
case, when the key server distributesone key for each potential user subset when a
user joins, the key server can reduce the leave communication cost to be constant.
However, under this scheme, the communication cost to distribute the keys can
be very high. From this discussion, we see that even if we are just interested in
communication cost, we have to consider both user join communication cost and
user leave communication cost.
3The objective of this paper is to derive a lower bound on rekeying commu-
nication cost, considering both user join requests and leave requests. We show
that given the forward access control requirement, i.e. a user who has left the
secure group cannot have access to future group keys, there exists a sequence of
2
n user joins and leaves such that the amortized per request communication cost
is
￿
(
l
n
(
n
)
).
The balance of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss
our system model. We present our lower bound in Section 3. We conclude in
Section 4.
2 System Model
2.1 Forward and backward access controls
There are two types of security requirements on a secure group key management
system:
￿ Backward access control: A newly joined user cannot gain access to past
group keys.
￿ Forward access control: After a user has left the secure group, she should
not be able to gain access to future group keys.
When the only requirement is backward access control, a simple key manage-
ment scheme with
O
(
1
) complexity can be designed. Assume the current group
key is
g
i. When the
i
+
1 -th new user joins, the key server sets
g
i
+
1
=
H
(
k
i
),
where
H
(
:
) is a secure one way function. Then what the key server needs to do
is to send
g
i
+
1 to the new user, and also multicasts a signal to other users so that
these users will do the hash to get the new key. As another approach without us-
ing secure one way function, the key server can encrypt
g
i
+
1 by
g
i. Again, this
approach has
O
(
1
) complexity.
The major difﬁculty arises when we have to provide forward access control.
Aswewillseelater, evenwithoutbackward access control, inorderto providefor-
ward access control, thecommunicationcost willhavealowerboundof
￿
(
l
n
(
n
)
),
where
n is the number of user join requests, and number of user leave requests.
Hereafter, we only consider forward access control.
42.2 Rekey assumptions
To derive any lower bound on a system or to prove the security property of a
system, we need to ﬁrst deﬁne our system model. The assumptions we made
about the system are:
￿ There is only one key server.
￿ Afterthekeyserverhas ﬁnishedprocessingarequest, allusersinthesession
(joined, but has not left yet) share a common group key. The user who has
left the secure group or has never joined the group does not have access
to the key. We denote the group key after the
i-th request as
g
i. Notice
that when the
i-th request is a join request, and backward access control is
not required, the key server may not change the group key, therefore, it is
possible that
g
i is the same as
g
i
+
1 in this case.
￿ When updating the keys, the key server uses one key
k to encrypt another
key
k
0.
￿ The communication cost is in terms of the number of times the key server
encryptsonekeywithanotherkeyanddistributeit. Whenwesay amessage,
we mean one key encrypted by another key. In implementation, several
encrypted keys can be put in one data packet.
￿ The adversary has inﬁnite storage power, i.e., all messages distributed by
the key server can be saved by the adversary.
2.3 Rekey encryption graphs
Inspired by thekey graph approach [9] by Wong, Goudaand Lam, we use directed
graphs to represent the rekeying process. However, we notice that a key graph
in [9] represents just a snapshot of the rekeying process. In order to represent a
whole rekeying process, and therefore make it possible to count the communica-
tion cost, we need to extend the key graph to include history informations. We
call our extended graphs rekey encryption graphs.
Our rekey encryption graphs consist of a sequence of graphs
f
G
i
g
1
i
=
1, where
graph
G
i models the rekeying process for the ﬁrst
i requests. Intuitively,we desire
that the number of edges in
G
i represents the number of messages that the key
server has sent for rekeying the ﬁrst
i requests.
Next, we describe the nodes and edges in a rekey encryption graph
G
i.
5G
i will include two types of nodes: key nodes, and user nodes. The set of user
nodes
M includes all potential users. The second type of nodes is key node. We
distinguish two types of key nodes. We ﬁrst include a special class of key nodes
called individual key nodes. These individual key nodes will be distributed by the
key server using a secure channel established between a user and the key server at
authenticationtime. The other key nodes represent thekeys that the key server has
ever generated and distributed by encrypting it using another key in
G
i in order to
process the ﬁrst
i requests.
G
i includes two types of edges. The ﬁrst type of edges is from a user node
u
to its individual key node
k. The second type of edges is inserted when a key
k is
distributed by the key server by encrypting it with another key
k
0. If the key server
sends out such a message, we have an edge from
k
0 to
k.
For a graph
G
i, we deﬁne a subgraph
S
i.F i r s t ,
S
i includes a user node
u if the
user should be in the secure group after the ﬁrst
i requests (joined but not left).
Second,
S
i includes the current group key node
g
i. Third, a key node or an edge
is in
S
i if it is on a path from a user node
u in
S
i to the current group key node
g
i.
Gi
G i+1
Si+1
gi gi+1
Figure 1: An example of rekey encryption graphs
Figure 1 shows examples of rekey encryption graphs. The whole graph rep-
resents
G
i
+
1. Inside
G
i
+
1 in the dashed cycle is
G
i. The six square nodes at the
bottom of the graph are user nodes. The six dashed circle nodes just above the
square nodes are the individual key nodes. There is an edge from a user node to
its individual key node. Each edge from one key node
k
0 to another key node
k
represents that the key server has sent out
k encrypted by
k
0.
g
i and
g
i
+
1 are the
group keys of
G
i and
G
i
+
1, respectively. Also shown in Figure 1 is
S
i
+
1,w h i c h
includes the four user nodes on the right bottom, the group key node
g
i
+
1,a n da l l
6the key nodes and edges that are on a path from a user node in
S
i
+
1 to the group
key node
g
i
+
1.
2.4 Rekey encryption graph properties
From our construction of rekey encryption graph
G
i, we know that the number
of edges in
G
i represents the number of messages that the key server has sent to
process the ﬁrst
i requests. We also notice that
G
i
￿
G
j,f o ra n y
i
<
j .
However, not all graphs can represent a rekeying process. To represent a
rekeyingprocessthatsatisfytheforward access controlrequirement, arekeygraph
G
i has to at least satisfy these following necessary properties:
￿ There is at least one path from a user node
u to the current group key
g
i if
u
is a member of the current group.
￿ There should be no path to the group key
g
i if a user
u is not in the current
group.
￿ For the following property, we limit to
S
i
￿
G
i. Denote
n as the total
number of user nodes in
S
i.D e ﬁ n e
i
(
x
) as the in-degree of a node
x in
S
i.
Deﬁne
P
(
u
) as the set of key nodes that are on a path from a user node
u to
the group key node
g
i. We deﬁne the cost
c
(
u
) of
u as:
c
(
u
)
=
X
x
2
P
(
u
)
i
(
x
) (1)
Denote
C as the maximal of
c
(
u
) among the
n users in
S
i:
C
=
m
a
x
8
u
s
e
r
n
o
d
e
u
c
(
u
) (2)
Deﬁne
s
(
n
) as the summation of the cost of all users in
S
i:
s
(
n
)
=
X
a
l
l
u
s
e
r
n
o
d
e
u
c
(
u
) (3)
Now, we can prove the following Lemma:
Lemma 1
s
(
n
)
￿
n
l
n
(
n
)
7Proof: Deﬁne
n
(
x
) as the number of user nodes in
S
i that can lead to
x.W e
observe that,
s
(
n
)
=
X
a
l
l
u
s
e
r
n
o
d
e
u
c
(
u
)
=
X
a
l
l
k
e
y
n
o
d
e
x
i
(
x
)
n
(
x
) (4)
Next, we prove
s
(
n
)
￿
n
l
n
(
n
) by induction on the height of the group
key. It is obvious that the lemma holds for group key height
1. Assume the
lemma is true for height less than or equal to
h. First, we can see that we
can reduce
S
i into a tree by pruning some edges. Assume the group key has
t non-overlaping connected children. Apply the induction assumption on
each child branch, we have
s
(
n
)
￿
t
n
+
t
X
i
=
1
n
i
l
n
(
n
i
) (5)
where
n
i is the number of user nodes that are below the
i-th child.
It is easy to verify that
f
(
x
)
=
x
l
n
(
x
) is a convex function, therefore, we
have
t
X
i
=
1
n
i
l
n
(
n
i
)
￿
t
P
t
i
=
1
n
i
t
l
n
(
P
t
i
=
1
n
i
t
) (6)
￿
n
l
n
(
n
t
) (7)
Plug (7) into (5), we have
s
(
n
)
￿
n
t
+
n
l
n
(
n
)
￿
n
l
n
(
t
) (8)
We know that
t
￿
l
n
(
t
)
>
0 for
t
￿
1, therefore,
s
(
n
)
￿
n
l
n
(
n
).
￿
Using Lemma 1, we have that
C
￿
l
n
(
n
) (9)
2.5 Rekey encryption graph limitations
Before we present our lower bound, we discuss the limitation of our model in this
subsection. The major limitation of this model is that we only allow the operation
8of singleencryption, i.e. encryption of one key by another key. It does not support
other operations. For example, it is possible that one key
k can be protected by
two keys
k
0 and
k
0
0 [4]. One way to implement this protection is to use the XOR
of two keys,
k
0 and
k
0
0, to encrypt
k. In this case, for an adversary to get
k,i th a s
to have both
k
0 and
k
0
0. To model this type of operation, we will have to increase
the expressing power of rekey graph by adding AND edges. We will address this
extension later.
3 Lower Bound of Rekeying Communication
With the preparation of the previous section, we prove in this section a lower
bound on the secure rekeying communication cost, considering both join requests
and leave requests. We notice that even though backward access control may not
be required, the key server may want to distribute some keys at join time in order
to reduce the cost of processing user leave request. Therefore, intuitively, it is
important that we consider a sequence of operations instead of a single operation.
u Si+1
Si
g i+1
g i
Figure 2: User
u leaves
Suppose the
i-th request is the leave request of user
u. For the purpose of our
construction, we assume that
u does not re-join. Then because of forward access
9control requirement, we know that there should not be a path from
u to any group
key
g
j in
G
j, where
j
>
i .L e t
P
(
u
)denote theset of key nodes on the path from
u
to the group key node
g
i in
G
i. To satisfy the forward access control requirement,
we know that no node in
P
(
u
) should be in
S
j,f o ra n y
j
>
i , because otherwise
user
u can gain access to future group keys. Figure 2 shows the scenario.
From the deﬁnition of the cost of a user node, we know that there are at least
c
(
u
) edges in
S
i, and these edges will not be in
S
j, where
j
>
i. In particular, if
we choose the user node with the largest cost, we know that there will be at least
l
n
(
n
) edges in
S
i, but these edges will not be in
S
j,f o ra n y
j
>
i .
Now, we can construct a sequence of
2
n requests to have
￿
(
n
l
n
(
n
)
) edges. In
another words, we will show that
G
2
n h a sa tl e a s t
￿
(
n
l
n
(
n
)
) edges. Remember
that the number of edges in
G
i is the number of messages a key server has to send
to process the
i requests. Therefore, the amortized number of edges per request is
￿
(
l
n
(
n
)
).
To construct the sequence, ﬁrst assume
n user join requests. These join re-
quests are followed by a sequence of
n user leave requests. Consider the ﬁrst
leave request. We know that this is the
n
+
1 -th request because there are
n join
requests ahead of it. We select the leaving user
u as the user who has the maxi-
mum
c
(
u
) of the remaining users. From previous discussion, we know that there
are at least
l
n
(
n
) edges in
S
n but not in
S
n
+
1. Since all previous requests are
join requests, we know that all these edges are added to process the
n join re-
quests. Continue this process on the next leave request. In this case, we can get
l
n
(
n
￿
1
) edges. We notice that the edges in the second leave may be either added
when the key server is processing the
n join requests or processing the ﬁrst leave
request. Continue this process for a total of
n times, we have at least a total of
l
n
(
n
)
+
l
n
(
n
￿
1
)
+
:
:
:
+
1
=
￿
(
n
l
n
(
n
)
) non-overlapping edges in the rekey en-
cryption graph
G
2
n. Since there is a total of
2
n requests, the amortized bandwidth
requirements per request is
￿
(
l
n
(
n
)
). Therefore, we have proved the following
theorem:
Theorem 1 Givenforwardaccesscontrolsecurityrequirement,andthekeyserver
distributes non-individual keys by encrypting one key using another key, there ex-
ists a sequence of
2
n requests such that the amortized per request communication
cost is
￿
(
l
n
(
n
)
).
104 Conclusion
We discussed in this paper a lower bound on communication cost for secure group
key management system. To model the rekeying process, we introduced the con-
cept of rekey encryption graphs. Using the rekey encryption graphs, we were able
to show that given the forward access control requirement, there exists a sequence
of
2
n join and leave requests such that the amortized per request communica-
tion cost is
￿
(
l
n
(
n
)
). This lower bound indicates that when the only allowed
operation for the key server to distribute a non-individual key is to encrypt it by
another key, the communication cost will be
￿
(
l
n
(
n
)
), given the known protocols
that have achieved this lower bound. Therefore, in order to further improve the
scalability of group rekeying communication cost, other operations will have to
be investigated. Another potential way to improve rekeying scalability is to relax
the security requirements. For example, one potential is to allow some users to
enjoy free ride when the lost of value can be offsetted by the saving of rekeying
cost. We are currently investigating these possibilities.
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